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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN TURKISH FOREIGN
POLICY DURING THE JDP GOVERNMENTS
Justice and Development Party‘s (JDP’s) foreign policy which has been formulated
by Ahmet Davutoðlu can be described as an eclectic and pragmatic foreign policy of
a “trading state”1 with some ideological and rhetorical colours. This policy at discursive
level refers to the glorious Ottoman past, religious and cultural linkages of Turkey with
the Muslim world and the ex-Ottoman geography spanning from North Africa to Mid-
dle East and to the Balkans.2 It describes Africa, Asia and Latin America as new fields
of interest. At practical level, this policy is based on a close cooperation with the global
hegemon US. It was aggressively targeting the EU membership but later lowered down
its temper mostly due to the reluctance of the EU side and de facto impracticability and
un-sustainability of working for a quick membership. Establishing and developing
good relations with Russia has also been targeted with this policy. This policy is also
based on a rhetorical criticism of the foreign policies of previous Turkish governments
with dogmatism and western oriented ideological blindness.
The last half of the second term of JDP government has witnessed a heated debate
on axis change in Turkish foreign policy.3 Israel’s attack on Gaza Strip in December
2008 while Turkish government was intermediating for a peace between Israel and
Syria; Prime Minister Erdoðan’s corresponding “one minute” reaction to Israeli presi-
dent Simon Perez; Israel’s attack on Mavi Marmara ship which was carrying humani-
tarian aid to Gaza strip that was subject to an Israeli blockade and Israel’s
disproportional use of power which caused the killing of 9 Turkish citizens; Turkey’s
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1 “Trading state” is a term that Kemal Kiriºçi introduced and used to name new Turkish foreign
policy (Kiriºçi, 2009).
2 Davutoðlu’s foreign policy, even though he rejects such claims, is frequently identified as pan
Ottomanist. For a concise account of the term neo-Ottomanism, pls. see Mustafa ªahin (2011). In this
article ªahin identifies JDP policies as neo-Ottomanist. He also explains why Davutoðlu refrains us-
ing this term by referring to Kemal Karpat who claimed that the term first used by Greeks after Turkey
landed its forces to Cyprus in 1974. So it is these negative connotations regarding the perception of the
Turks in ex-Ottoman territories why JDP does reject this naming.
3 Some of the Turkish columnists and scholars who refer to this debate are, Mensur Akgün
(2009), Mehmet Ali Birand (2010), Cengiz Çandar (2000), Yalým Eralp (2010), Tarýk Oðuzlu (2008).
It is also important to note that most of the Turkish scholars who are talking about this axis shift on
Turkish foreign policy are either very shy or careful about their claims. The careful ones mostly refer
to the claims on axis shift made by others and try to analyze this question with care. It is mostly the
non-Turkish scholars who claimed that there exists a tangible shift/change on TFP. Among these,
Thomas Friedman (2010), Mark Steyn (2010), Dominique Moisi (2009), Efraim Inbar (2011) can be
referred.
no vote on the UN Security Council resolution to impose additional sanctions to Iran
and Turkey’s Syria policy which was not following the tough policies that US was fol-
lowing and proposing for Turkey, have been the important indicators and turning points
for this claimed change.
However, together with the start of Arab Spring, US’s evacuation of Iraq and Tur-
key’s permission to NATO to launch an anti-missile system in Malatya; Turkey’s angry
reaction to Syrian government against their repressive actions on the sectarian conflict
in this country, another debate which emphazises a return on Turkish policy to the tradi-
tional western oriented diplomacy started.
Among these events US’s evacuation of Iraq has a critical effect over the course of
events. It was expected by the regional actors that this withdrawal would create a power
vacuum in Iraq. So actors which have an interest over the region acted more swiftly to
take the advantage in this country. This led to an increase in the visibility of the under-
current on going conflicts mainly between Iran and Turkey. Pace of events increased
more with the Arab spring. Then it became impossible for regional actors to settle dis-
putes slowly and keep them under their control. The size of the crises and the arguments
of the uprising groups also made it difficult for Turkish government to develop a consis-
tent foreign policy.
This article aims to go behind the debate on the change in Turkish foreign policy at
rhetorical level. It also critically analyses the arguments which claim that Turkey re-
turned back to its original foreign policy stance. It basically claims that there has been
a deep on going material change on the social and economic bases of Turkish foreign
policy for last 30 years. What JDP basically did was reading this change truly and con-
veying it to the political level through a populist rhetoric and populist policies. This
populist policy addressed the political needs that already existed at societal and eco-
nomic level and tried to convert this need on foreign policy field to the votes of Turkish
citizens for last three elections.
The article will first examine Davutoðlu’s theoretical perspective which frames this
change and lead both the change and its actors. Then, increasing international commer-
cial and economic activities of Turkish businessman; increasing cultural interactions
and lastly increasing human mobility will be analysed. What is new on Davutoðlu’s for-
eign policy formulations; whether there is a change in the direction of foreign trade and
international investments; whether there exists a new dynamism in the cultural interac-
tions field and whether there exist a change in Turkish citizens’mobility are some of the
basic questions that will be answered in this article. These questions and their answers
will be linked to the change in Turkish foreign policy debate in the concluding section.
FOREIGN POLICY PERCEPTION OF THE JDP: FOREIGN MINISTER
AHMET DAVUTOÐLU’S THEORETICAL APPROACH
From the beginning JDP leadership trusted Ahmet Davutoðlu on its foreign policy
formulations and operations. Davutoðlu’s influence is mainly due to the former Foreign
Minister and current president Abdullah Gül and Prime Minister Erdoðan’s will to
adopt Davutoðlu’s vision to Turkish Foreign Policy’s implementation (Aras, 2009: 3)
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as it just fits to their political ideology. An academic by origin, Ahmet Davutoðlu had
tried to apply his academic studies and works to Turkey’s current foreign policy stance
and policy projections for the future. Davutoðlu, during the early period of his align-
ment with the JDP preferred to stay away from the public’s eyes and tried to guide
JDP’s foreign policy as an advisor to the Prime Minister. He had been known as the
head/master architect of Turkish Foreign Policy in between 2002 and May 2009. By
May 2009, he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.
The roots/clues of Foreign Minister Davutoðlu’s understanding regarding Turkish
Foreign Policy can be seen in his book titled, the Strategic Depth (2009). The book
makes a comprehensive critique of Turkish Foreign policy since the Ottoman period.
This critique is made through a strategy discipline perspective. After presenting the ba-
sic principles of frequently referred strategic thinking, Davutoðlu draws some conclu-
sions and gives some prescriptions for an effective and influential implementation of
Turkish foreign policy, in this book.4
For Davutoðlu strategic thinking is very crucial for the formulation and implemen-
tation of an effective FP. For him geography and time dimensions are the two factors
that are very important to have a deep insight and understanding about the processes
that countries are in (Davutoðlu, 2010: 6). Turkey has geographic advantages and very
valuable historical luggage/assets that she should be considered. During the Cold War
period Turkey had tried to utilize this geographical luggage in a very static manner and
did not intentionally referred to cultural and historical assets (ibidem: 116). However
the geography did not provide the expected advantages, as history,5 strategic thinking
and political will dimensions were lacking.
Davutoðlu grounds his strategic mentality concept to history but at the same time
the strategic planning that he refers to is based on the realities of the day. So Davutoðlu
basically tries to combine this strategic mentality with the strategic planning (ibidem:
61). This way of thinking makes history and culture dynamic and useful tools to de-
velop a foreign policy for today’s needs without making history and culture a static and
costly liability.
Davutoðlu puts a mathematical formula which shows the determinants of power
that he frequently refers in his book. This formula speaks for itself. It is: P = (CV + PV)
× (SI × SP × PW).6
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4 Davutoðlu was criticized from within his party by a member of party’s governing board as he
was conducting Turkish Foreign Policy according to his book and as he was promoting his person.
Davutoðlu responded to these claims that the book was written in an earlier time and some parts would
be older as well as the conditions and he was not conducting the foreign policy according to the book.
He also stated that Foreign policy was determined by taking into consideration developments and Tur-
key’s interests under the direction of Prime Minister Erdogan and the claim which was stating that he
was bringing himself forward was out of question (“Milliyet”, 2010).
5 Davutoðlu charges Turkish intellectuals as they cut the linkages with the Ottoman and Seljuk
Empire periods on their thoughts and writings (Davutoðlu, 2010: 407).
6 In this formula SM refers to Strategic Mentality; SP refers to Strategic Planning and PW refers
to Political Will, CV refers to Constant Variables and it is basically comprised of history (h), geogra-
phy (g), population (p) and culture (c); PV refers to Potential Variables and it comprises of economic
potential (ep), technological capacity (tc) and military capacity (mc). The expanded form of this for-
mula is: P = [(h + g + p + c) × (ep + tc + mc)] × (SM × SP × PW). See: Davutoðlu (2010: 17).
This formula basically says that a country’s or political actors’ power is related with
their history, geography, population and culture plus that country’s economic, techno-
logical and military capacity. However cumulating these factors is not sufficient to
show a country’s power. These assets only after furnished, supported by a strategic
mentality, strategic planning and political will, will make a multiplier effect and would
create a boost and make country more powerful.
This formula with its first part, basically, configures the traditional understanding of
conservative thinkers and political parties in Turkey. So, reference to geography, popu-
lation, culture and specifically to Ottoman past is not new.7 What is new in this formula-
tion is the stress to strategic mentality, strategic planning and political will and the
boosting effect of all of them. Davutoðlu claims that all the factors in the first part,
could have a meaning and a real impact only after the inclusion or implementation of
the second part of the formula. Turkey has already had the first part and it is very rich
compared to other countries in this field. However the second part was missing and
JDP has basically tried to fill this second part by adopting a strategic mentality, and
strategic planning manner backed by a strong political will. JDP’s long and stable sin-
gle party government period also helped to the effective implementation of this mental-
ity and planning.
Focus on strategic mentality leads to a change in the perception of economy and cul-
ture. JDP governments, in line with the first part of formula, engaged in activities to
create new incentives for Turkey’s business community on international trade. This
was an already existing pattern since 1983. What JDP added to this pattern was the stra-
tegic mentality. This policy was also fed from the demands of newly rising classes that
were in close contact with the ruling party. On the social level, mostly with the demands
and incentives of economic agents, cultural encounters, starting with neighbours and
important markets, increased. High level trade missions headed by Prime Minister or
the President mostly concluded with bilateral agreements to facilitate trade and cultural
interaction. These agreements provided free trade opportunities, cultural interaction
and a free travel regime in the region.
On the remaining parts of this article some structural/paternal changes on some de-
cisive areas of Turkish politics and economy as well as social life will be examined.
CHANGE IN TURKEY’S FOREIGN TRADE AND SERVICES
The activities of Turkish traders have increasingly influenced the decisions and
stance of Turkish governments during the last 30 years. Since the January 24 Decisions
(1980), Turkey has been following export promotion policy instead of previous pe-
riod’s import promotion policies. This policy created a very important dynamism in
Turkish economy, politics and society. The agents of this policy, big, medium and small
size industrialists, and traders started to search for new markets to sell their products.
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7 Among the conservative scholars reference to Ottoman legacy, and being inspired by this, is ob-
served in different degrees. Among these scholars one can count Osman Turan (1969), Yýlmaz Öztuna
(1998), Yahya Kemal (1975), Samiha Ayverdi (1975–76), Mehmet Kaplan (1967).
Once they exploited their immediate destinations and faced competition with the trad-
ers from other nations they looked for other markets. So starting from the most secure
guaranteed markets to least secure and risky markets, traders from different strata’s of
society and parts of economy, run for access to and possession of new markets.
The Customs Union with the EU was one of the most important developments in
this process. Customs Union opened up European markets to Turkish producers and
traders and they benefited from these regular and easy to operate markets. Turkish
economy at this moment seems highly dependent to the European markets. However as
Turkey is not within the Union as a full member and as she does not have a say over the
political decisions which direct the European trade, European market is too much out of
control. So for instance Brussels has concluded free trade agreements with Mexico and
South Korea. This fact already disturbed the profit margins of Turkish traders as those
new countries are also provided with an access to the EU market in return for some
gains for the Europeans.8 As European market is too competitive profit margins are al-
ready low for Turkey’s not so high tech industries.
Turkish government’s policy of keeping the exchange value of Turkish lira rela-
tively high vis-à-vis the other currencies also forced Turkish traders to search for new
markets in which they would have less competition and higher profit margins. Russia,
Central Asia, Balkans have been the first markets that Turkey’s traders and service pro-
viders tried to gain. Geographical proximity, family connections, language skills and
cultural and/or religious closeness helped Turkish businessman in this process.
As it was mentioned above, JDP government adopted a strategic mentality perspec-
tive to foreign trade as well. This facilitated the already existing interest of Turkish trad-
ers for neighbouring markets and markets of countries with similar cultural and
religious background. These new market areas have been considered as natural exten-
sion that Turkey should work with. Once the commercial relations started, the process
became mutually constitutive. Businessman asked for better relations with these com-
mercially fertile markets. The JDP governments saw these markets and developing
good relations with their governments, not as a burden but as an asset for Turkey. It is
not easy to say which started first; traditionally it is quite difficult to have good com-
mercial relations before government gave a green light. But if there is no big problem
and things to lose, it is easier for government to give this green light as it perceives de-
veloping trade as employment and tax generator at least. However, as it is the case with
Iran and Armenia, even though there are ready agents to initiate business, the trade po-
tential cannot be utilized effectively due to the political barriers.
When examined in a time frame, the changing patterns of Turkey’s foreign trade be-
come highly visible, during the JDP governments. Turkey’s export performance shows
a steady increase between 2001 and 2011 except a contraction which existed due to the
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8 The countries which signed a free trade agreement cannot be forced to sign the similar agree-
ments with Turkey. Therefore, they can sell their products to Turkey without customs duties; however
Turkish traders should pay a customs duty when they export their products to those countries. As the
EU has been signing such free trade agreements with other countries (negotiations with Russia, India
and Canada are continuing) and as those countries avoid signing such agreements bilaterally with Tur-
key, the advantages that the Customs Union Agreement created for Turkish industrialists are diminish-
ing (“Cumhuriyet”, 2010).
global economic crises in 2009. The actual growth of Turkey’s total exports reached to
331% by the end of 2011 since 2001. Even though it is still the number one export desti-
nation, there is a net 10 points decline on the share of the European Union in Turkey’s
exports in this period. There exists an 11 points increase in Turkey’s export to the Near
and the Middle East and it reached 21% by 2011 from a 10% of 2001.
An examination of Turkey’s export performance by country groups particularly
shows us that there is a very big increase on Turkey’s exports to the Organization of Is-
lamic Conference countries, Economic Cooperation Organization, Organization of
Black Sea Economic Cooperation countries and Commonwealth of Independent States
members both in percentage and volume in the same time period.
Table 1
Turkey’s export by country groups
Foreign Trade by Selected
Country Groups
Export Import
2011 2001 change 2011 2001 change
OECD 67,114,103 21,307,462 215% 121,327,633 26,885,976 351%
EFTA 1,887,252 316,114 497% 5,845,715 1,480,929 295%
Black Sea Economic Cooperation 17,767,964 2,932,471 506% 38,770,181 5,553,206 598%
Economic Cooperation Organization 9,291,736 971,620 856% 17,305,837 1,237,671 1298%
Commonwealth of Independent States 13,376,636 1,978,150 576% 33,159,185 4,630,241 616%
Turkic Republics 5,039,884 557,362 804% 3,642,096 282,509 1189%
Organization of Islamic Conference 37,325,453 4,196,595 789% 31,417,772 5,539,877 467%
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.tuik.gov.tr, 19.05.2013.
When Turkey’s import figures examined in the same time frame it is seen that the
European Union is still the biggest provider for Turkey. However the EU’s share shows
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a 10 point decline and share of Asia (China, India etc.) increases 10 points in the same
period. Economic Cooperation Organization, Turkic Republics, Organization of Black
Sea Economic Cooperation, Commonwealth of Independent States and Organization of
Islamic Conference member countries are other important providers which constantly
increased their shares in Turkish economy in the same order.
There is also a steady increase in the performance of Turkey’s construction compa-
nies’ services abroad. In this field Commonwealth of Independent States, Middle East
and African Countries are the first three regions in which Turkish construction compa-
nies made business most between 2004 and 2010.9
Arab spring made a temporary impact on Turkey’s export and construction services.
Free trade agreement with Syria is annulled, Libya is in turmoil and construction com-
panies are influenced from this fact. However, after a probable democratic settlement,
relations would be expected to go deeper, Turkey and her business agents would take
more shares over these countries’ economies.
EXPORT OF CULTURAL PRODUCTS AND CHANGING TOURIST
COMPOSITION
The visible dynamism at the culture industry has its impact on the perceived change
on Turkish Foreign Policy as well. The activity in this field, create an impact over the
audiences and readers of the countries which consume Turkish cultural products. Tur-
key becomes a country that the public in those countries follow. The interaction among
Turkey and those countries remarkably increases and let to a ramification.
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9 http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/ANL/YurtDisiMuteahhitDB/.../sektor.doc, 19.02.2011.
According to UNDP statistics, Turkey has been the second fastest growing econ-
omy after India by 18.3% growth rate on art industry. Turkey’s estimated total foreign
trade on movies, music and literature is about USD 528 million with USD 408 million
exports and USD 120 million imports.
The export volume of copyrights for translations from Turkish is about USD
400 million per year and reached to USD 2 billion within last 5 years (“Zaman”, 2010).
Ministry of Culture has been conducting a project named TEDA for promotion of trans-
lation and publishing of Turkish cultural products abroad. According to this project
151 books were translated and published in Germany, 93 books in Bulgaria, 46 books in
Iran, 41 books in the US, 38 books in Egypt, 32 books in France, 30 books in Macedonia,
29 books in Greece, 28 in Bosnia Herzegovina, 25 in Russia since 2005. The total volume
of published books within this Project has reached to 893 by February 2013.10
There has been a steady increase in the export of Turkish TV dramas since 2006,
too. Central Asian, Arabic, Central European and Balkan countries are the main buyers
of these dramas. More than 70 “made in Turkey” TV dramas exported to more than
20 different countries and reached to a volume of 50 million USD by the end of
year 2010.11
Especially the export of TV dramas has been very influential over the development
of a positive image of Turkey in her region. A research conducted by Turkish Economic
and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) shows that 78% of the interviewees have at
least once in their lifetime watch a Turkey made TV drama. This ratio is highest in Iraq
by 89% and in Syria by 85 per cents. These dramas are very popular in the Arab world
and interviewees can name 15 Turkish dramas and artists region wide when they are
asked. Popularity of these dramas have its impacts over Turkeys export performance
and incoming tourism industry. The stars of these dramas are used in the advertisement
of Turkish consumer products in the Middle East. There are plans to install Turkey
made consumer products into these TV dramas to be able to make indirect advertise-
ment of them. TV dramas also promoted Turkey’s tourism. People from all Arab world
and Balkans come to Turkey to visit the locations that those TV dramas are shot
(Mensur Akgün et al., 2010: 15–16; Buttler, 2009).
However, there are also some resistance and critiques to exported Turkish cultural prod-
ucts, especially Turkish TV dramas. The conservative political groups that rose to power
during the Arab spring are quite critical of these TV dramas. They found these dramas dan-
gerous for the moral and religious values of their traditional societies. There is a tendency
for censorship among those countries. However those dramas are still the mostly viewed
ones today and lead to an increase in tourist numbers from Middle East to Turkey.
Increasing tourist interest to Turkey is not only related with the TV dramas. In be-
tween 2003 and 2009 the number of tourists that visited Turkey increased 90% and
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10 Total number of books translated from Turkish to other languages since the foundation of the
republic does not exceed 500 (“Zaman”, 2010). So 893 books in 8 years is a big leap forward,
http://www.tedaproject.gov.tr.
11 President of Calinos Holding Company Fýrat Gülgen, which makes 80% of the total exports of
Turkish dramas, states that increasing popularity of Prime Minister Erdogan, specifically after the
“one minute incident” in Davos, facilitated their sales in the Middle East (“Milliyet”, 2011).
reached to 23,091,896 from 12,134,197. The increase in ratio in ten EU member coun-
tries, in the same period is only 53 per cent.12 The increase from other OECD coun-
tries is 172%; from Commonwealth of Independent States is 237%; from other
Southeast Asian countries is 156%; other West Asian countries 210%; other African
countries 255% and other American countries 255%. A selected sample that is shown
below also tells us that ex-Soviet republics and Middle Eastern countries are occupy-
ing the first two ranks in the increase among the tourist that visits Turkey (Turkish
Statistical Institute).
Table 2
Tourists visiting Turkey
2003 2009 change %
Total 12,134,197 23,091,896 90
Ukraine 185,929 460,980 148
Russia 1,178,262 2,065,588 75
Georgia 148,488 974,111 556
Azarbaijan 189,910 404,063 113
Tunusia 34,449 53,891 56
USA 213,699 614,025 187
Canada 39,171 143,065 265
Syria 134,126 457,099 241
Iran 375,496 1,291,592 244
Ýsrael 236,643 252,041 7
Japan 79,912 146,804 84
Australia 47,241 123,546 162
Country group’s total 2,863,326 6,986,805 144
EU10 6,365,603 9,760,651 53
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.tuik.gov.tr, 19.05.2013.
The change in number and qualities of travels of Turkish citizens also influences
Turkey’s Foreign policy interests and decisions. It creates awareness among the citi-
zens about the world. This awareness and demand for more travel, when faced with visa
barriers has its reflections at political level. The areas that were not within the sight of
government are brought forward by travelling people, and visa became a political issue
for the government to attract more sympathy and vote from the public. It can be also
said that a kind of positive populism and nationalism developed out of visa issue.
Travel patterns of Turkish citizens, in terms of selected/decided destination coun-
tries, has been showing a gradual change. Turkish citizens have been travelling abroad
more than ever. The total number of Turkish citizens travelling abroad was 3,516,885
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12 These ten EU member countries are Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Netherland, The UK, Sweden, Italy and Greece.
by year 2003. This number increased 62.6 per cent and reached to 5,717,079 by year
2009. The increase on Turkish citizens travelling to EU15 has been realized as 40.9%.
This increase is 21.7 points less than the overall average increase. This increase reaches
115.1% in a selected sample of mostly visited non-EU countries. This is 52.5 point in-
crease above the average.
Table 3
States visited by Turkish tourists
States visited by Turkish citizens 2003 2009
% change
(2009–2003)
Total 3,516,885 5,717,079 62.6
EU 15 885,898 1,248,499 40.9
EU 27 1,635,381 2,144,796 31.1
EU27–EU15 749,483 896,297 19.6
Non-EU 1,881,504 3,572,283 89.9
Selected countries* 1,097,399 2,360,920 115.0
* Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Russia, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Israel, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, the United Arabic Emirates, Iraq, Iran, China, India,
Afghanistan, Malaysia, USA, Albania, Libya.
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), http://www.tuik.gov.tr, 19.05.2013.
This change in Turkish citizens’ visits abroad is mostly related to the visa regula-
tions that destination countries apply. New Turkish bourgeoisie who have resources and
curiosity about the external world wants to travel more for various reasons. When they
face visa restrictions they change their route to countries which are relatively easy and
cheap to visit. Travel programs on private and state owned TV channels which create
curiosity about foreign destinations13 and recent visa removal agreements that the gov-
ernment made with several countries are also expected to be influential over peoples’
travel decisions.14
CHANGE IN THE DIRECT AND INDIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN TURKEY
Turkey’s economy having serious capital shortages have been running for foreign
direct and indirect investment. For this end Turkey–Japan relations developed during
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13 Among these TV shows which create curiosity on Turkish people about the outside world Barýº
Manço’s “7’den 70’e”; Mehmet Ali Birand’s international news oriented “32.Gün”; Samanyolu TV’s
faith based mission oriented “Ayna”; Türksoy’s Turkish speaking communities focused TV shows are
important ones.
14 There was a boom on visits to Syria. However after the demonstrations and then civil conflict
started and Turkey-Syrian relations deteriorated touristic visits shrunk and almost stopped. Even
though Greece only removed visa for green passports, there is a visible increase on Turkish green
passport holder citizens visits to this country.
the 80s. The governments, in order to attract more investment, tried to develop good re-
lations with countries which are considered potential investors. So attracting foreign di-
rect investment and foreign indirect investment is important for governments and it has
its projection over the foreign policy decisions and behaviours.
It is quite difficult to collect and analyse data regarding this field. The basic reason is
that the money does not have a passport and can travel freely all around the world. After
the big increase in the petroleum prices there has been a great fortune accumulation on
the petroleum producing countries. It has been openly declared by Turkish government
authorities that the government was running after this excess Money in the Gulf
(Erdoðan, 2010; Wigglesworth, Strauss, 2010).
According to the Middle East Journal, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arabic
Emirates, Bahrain and Oman (Gulf Cooperation Council – GCC members) earned a to-
tal of more than USD 1.5 trillion from their exports in the five year period in between
2002–2006. Of this amount some USD 542 billion representing the capital funds en-
tered global capital markets. So, the GCC countries foreign assets reached to USD
1.6 trillion (The Middle East, 2007: 39).
The JDP has been trying to attract some of this money to Turkey. Even though there
is not concrete evidence, the strength of Turkish economy to international financial cri-
ses and shocks would be partly related with the success of government to attract this
money to Turkey. Even before the JDP came to power, Turkish economies’foreign cap-
ital hunger was a well-known fact. Pre-JDP governments had been searching this
money mostly in the European and US financial markets. During the Özal years Japan
became a new and an alternative destination.
It was either from the European, or US market, most probably the Petro dollars of
the Gulf countries had also been routed to Turkey through the European and American
finance corporations with an additional profit margin for western finance corporations.
There were ideological reasons and settled patterns which were directing Turkey’s fi-
nance sector to those destinations. Together with the JDP, a new cadre which was ideo-
logically not that much distant to Arab capital, which had been in contact with the Arab
world due to religious solidarity or cultural closeness broke this pattern and started to
work with Arab countries as well. This does not mean that they quit working with Eu-
rope and the US. The basic principle had been pragmatism next to ideological and cul-
tural closeness in this period.
Due to these ideological framework changes at governmental level and changes at
global economic level, including the new giant petro dollar surplus in the gulf, the na-
ture of foreign direct investment to Turkey has been changing since 2005. The amount
of foreign direct investment reached to USD 10 billion by a radical shift from previous
years USD 2.9 billion by 2005. With this change Turkey’s share in global total foreign
direct investment reached to 1% from previous years’ 0.4%. After another important
shift to 1.4% by 2006, Turkey has kept its global share around 1% in foreign direct in-
vestments. By 2009, this share went down to 0.7% by USD 7.6 billion FDI. Due to the
economic crises experienced by 2008 and 2009, this change does not say so much for
the moment.
When these figures are analysed in detail it can be seen that there has been a change
in the share of European countries on FDI. This share was 86.8% by 2004. By 2005, it
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reduced to 77.9%. There has been a return in 2006 by 82.6%. By 2007 there was a radi-
cal fall to 67.8%. This ratio returned to 2004 level by 2009 with 84.9%.
Table 4
Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment by Regions
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Europe (million USD) 1,033 6,652 14,574 12,974 11,342 4,834
Share (%) 86.8 77.9 82.6 67.8 77.0 84.9
North America (million USD) 97 114 969 4,223 886 271
Share (%) 8.2 1.3 5.5 22.1 6.0 4.8
Asia/Near and Middle East (million USD) 54 1,678 1,910 608 2,199 262
Share (%) 4.5 19.7 10.8 3.2 14.9 4.6
Asia/Other (million USD) 6 78 17 797 162 299
Share (%) 0.5 0.9 0.1 4.2 1.1 5.3
Other Regions (million USD) – 13 169 535 144 28
Share (%) 0.0 0.2 1.0 2.8 1.0 0.5
Total (million USD) 1,190 8,535 17,639 19,137 14,733 5,694
* Central Bank of Turkey
Source: Foreign Direct Investment Evaluation Report (2009), YASED.
In these periods, investors of Asian, Near and Middle Eastern countries showed
a visible and measurable but not that much stable/regular interest to Turkish economy
in terms of direct foreign investment. These countries’ share was around 4.5% by 2004.
By 2005 with a radical shift upward, it reached to 19.7% which was the highest level
during the last decade. Their share fell down to 10.8% by 2006 and with a contraction to
3.2% by 2007. There has been a return to 14.9% by 2008 and another contraction to
4.6% by 2009 which was an expected outcome of the economic crises (Foreign, 2009).
Turkey’s general performance to attract foreign direct investment has increased
since 2005 and Middle and Near Eastern countries had increased their share in the total
FDI figures even though this was not stable and steady process. Arab countries in this
period heavily invested on telecommunication, finance, real-estate and health sectors.
Only the appropriation of Turk Telekom by Oger Telecom amounted USD 6.5 billion.
Appropriation of Adabank by Kuwaiti origin company The International Investor
amounted USD 45.1 million; appropriation of MNG bank by Dubai Islamic Bank by
USD 160 million are some of the examples of big transactions in this period. There
have been also Arab capital investments in Istanbul Stock Exchanges. According to
Yavuz Semerci (2007), the speculated amount of Gulf countries originated investment
in Istanbul Stock Exchanges is about USD 5 billion.15
Even though it is difficult to determine the exact source of foreign investment in-
crease, it can be said that there is an increase on the share of Middle and Near Eastern
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15 It should be noted that it is nearly impossible to determine the source of foreign capital which is
funded in Ýstanbul Stock Exchanges as it is quite difficult to trace the movement of money in the
world.
Capital in Turkey. Simon Williams, the Chief Economist at HSBC, explains the reason
of this interest to Turkish economy by Gulf countries, in quite an economic/efficient
way. “It is an obvious and natural relationship [...] The Gulf has capital and Turkey has
capital needs. They are close geographically, there are cultural and religious similari-
ties, and Turkey is a good economic story right now”.16 When this “natural” environ-
ment, combined with the efforts of Turkish government to attract FDI with signed and
worked Free Trade Agreements; and Turk-Arab Economic Forums, the fifth of which
was made by June 2010, the outcome has been an increase in the share of Arab coun-
tries in FDIs. There have also been references to Turkey’s EU venue as the reason of
this increasing Arab capital interest to Turkey. EU venue makes Turkey more predict-
able and provides capital owners a vision for the future of the country (Ýdiz, 2010).
When analysing the flow of foreign capital to Turkey the foreign capital phobia in
this country should also be analysed. There is a discrimination against Arab capital that
rises from non-governmental groups and becomes visible at national media. This dis-
crimination also makes the Arab capital a bit hesitant on their investment decisions to
Turkey (Dikbaº, 2008). Arab capital phobia is mainly visible among the secular nation-
alist circles which have some concerns about the intentions of the Arab capital. This
discrimination or capital phobia is not only limited to Arab capital. The intentions of
any Jewish capital are also subject to scrutiny but this time mainly by religious and na-
tionalist political groups.17
It should also be noted that that during the last 10–20 years, the intentions of Euro-
pean, US, Japanese or Russian capital have not been questioned except some general
ideological objections which has been raised by some limited nationalist and/or social-
ist political groups.
This fact provides non-Arab and non-Jewish capital some relative advantages in
Turkey. For the moment it can be said that Turkey due to the increasing performance of
her economy and her big growth rate has been developing some capabilities to attract
some of the Gulf capital which does not have a political power to back/protect her in-
vestments abroad. JDP government seems as if providing the guarantees that the Gulf
capital needed due to previously established ideological, political and cultural ties.
The Gulf capital has been directly going to countries which provide a high degree of
shelter and guarantees for them. The existing tendency of free and independent move-
ment of this capital without the guidance and protection of western finance moguls
would be something threatening the hegemonic monopoly of European and western
capital centres for the mid-term future. However for the moment the west seems as if re-
possessed her oligopolistic share in Turkish FDI market.
This pressure to the current structure of the system can also be read that Turkey
would rise as a new finance centre for the Gulf capital through which Gulf capital own-
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16 Quoted by Robin Wigglesworth and Delphine Strauss (2010).
17 Galataport project would be an example of this incident. Next to the rightful objections of some
writers about the content of the project which would destruct the historical panorama of Istanbul, there
were some opponents who had an anti-Jewish attitude as well (Sabah, 2005) even Prime Minister
Erdoðan criticised the ones who declare their objection to Galataport project as anti-Jewish
(Baºbakan, 2005).
ers can enjoy a safe shelter in which they would also have a political impact over
a strong government with which they could easily communicate in return for a contin-
ues capital supply from which Turkish governments could gain a strength vis-à-vis the
western financial centres speculative strikes.
* * *
There has been a change pattern in Turkish foreign policy since the 1980s. Eco-
nomic liberalism, democratization and the end of the Cold War were the factors which
led to this change. This occurred mostly due to structural reasons. JDP governments’
contribution to the change was, mainly related to rhetorical and ideological flavor that
was visible in Davtuoðu’s foreign policy and power formulations.
JDP as a populist political party responded to the undercurrent and tried to re-position
Turkish state to float in harmony with these. When JDP went beyond the domestic and
international structural limits due to her narrow ideological preferences as she did dur-
ing the Syrian Civil War, these constraints pulled her down to stay within the limits.
Turkish foreign policy has been fluctuating since the beginning of the second term
of the JDP government. During 2009 and 2010 period it has been boldly claimed that
there was a diversion from the traditional western oriented stance of the Turkish foreign
policy. Starting with the Arab Spring and during the late stages of Egyptian Revolution
and Libyan Revolution (especially after the evacuation of 25,000 Turkish migrant
workers from this country), Turkey, reconsidered her foreign policy and came closer to
the US and the West, again. When demonstrations began and Syrian government ag-
gressively suppressed opposition groups, Turkey’s side without any doubt was clear
and together with the west. Government openly criticized Syrian government with
which she had unbelievably genuine looking relations just a while ago, for her brutal re-
actions against her own citizens and declared her support for the demonstrators. Tur-
key’s bilateral relations with Iran also radically changed in this period. After Turkey
granted permission to the launch of NATO commanded anti-missile system in Malatya,
Turkey–Iran relations deteriorated.
Sectarian differences and competition is frequently shown as the main reason of re-
cent change in Turkey-Iran relations and Turkey’s attitude change about Syria. This ar-
gument does not tell what triggered this sectarian conflict and shaken the already
existing balance between Iran, Syria and Turkey. The change, at least partially, seems as
if linked with the US’s evacuation of Iraq. For Turkey, Iran’s attempt to fill the existing
power vacuum in Iraq and governments perceived encirclement of the country with
a Shiite crescent, for Iran being excluded from Iraqi politics and following a regime
change in Syria, perception of being encircled with a Sunni crescent seems as if the
main fears and concerns dominating the mutual distrust and confrontational foreign
policy positions of the parties. One should also mention that this mutual distrust and
mutually feeding threat perceptions are partially influenced by the predominant view of
the US and Western authorities and scholars that see Iraq and Syria as states which are
mainly composed of people from different sects and denominations. Once this view
dominates a polity, it is unavoidable for smaller powers to take their positions accord-
ingly and see the “reality” from the perspective of the hegemonic power.
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Even though Turkish government had developed good relations with the authoritarian
leaders of the Middle Eastern countries, including Iran, Syria and Libya in the recent past,
after seeing that these leaders would not stand out against political opposition that de-
mand more liberty, it became impossible for JDP government to continue her support to
those leaders. Being accused as non-democratic by supporting those authoritarian leaders
was also a risk that JDP would not like to take. There are very big systemic constraints
over the region and it is quite difficult for Turkish government to resist the pressures of
global hegemon, the US and her western allies. The attractiveness of filling the power
vacuum after the US withdrawal from Iraq and having some advantages on her struggle
against to PKK are pull factors that could be listed as reasons of change here.
Taking into consideration the transitional nature of all these regional developments,
it could be claimed that Turkish foreign policy would be normalized after the settlement
of these crises. Following the establishment of a relatively stable international regime
in the region (it is not necessary to see dearly regimes around), one could expect that
Turkish foreign policy would try to return to the line that was observed during the sec-
ond JDP government period. In such circumstances, Turkey would act again, as mainly
a trading state which develops cultural and political relations with her neighbours by
avoiding confrontational politics. Even a change in the government composition would
not lead to a big diversion but some rhetorical changes. This expected tendency is
mainly related to the economic and social changes that Turkey has been experiencing.
Agents of the economy are more aggressive and keep looking for new markets, Turkish
economy has been integrated with the capitalist trading networks in the world, there are
more and more investments done by the international capital. Turkey’s population has
developed an interest in the world surrounding them. Turkish people want to travel
more and the country is visited by more people from a wide spectrum of destinations.
Turkey has been receiving migrants from Asia and Africa and you can see a Turkish Di-
aspora Community all around the world. All these factors force and motivate political
parties and governments to develop a more liberal and out looking foreign policy in-
stead of a confrontational and inward looking one.
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ABSTRACT
There has been a wide debate in Turkey about the changing orientations, directions and con-
ducts of Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) during the JDP governments. This article examines the
JDP era with reference to some structural changes such as change in Turkey’s foreign trade pro-
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file, change on Turkish citizens travel destinations and changing composition of incoming tour-
ists to Turkey, change in Turkey’s culture industry and exportation of Turkey’s culture products
abroad, change in foreign direct investments to Turkey. The article also examines the ideational
parameters of JDP’s foreign policy based on the writings and speeches of Ahmet Davutoðlu as
intellectual architect and then as JDP government’s Minister of Foreign Affairs fully in charge of
design and conduct of foreign policy. The article basically concludes that the change on TFP has
been based on some deeper changes in Turkey at economic, political and sociological level since
1983. These domestic and international structured changes, interpreted by Davutoðlu in a partic-
ular way led to the change and the change debate on Turkish Foreign Policy.
KONTYNUACJA I ZMIANA W TURECKIEJ POLITYCE ZAGRANICZNEJ
W OKRESIE RZ¥DÓW JDP
STRESZCZENIE
Od chwili przejêcia w³adzy w Turcji przez partiê JDP, prowadzona jest debata na temat
zmiany kierunków i realizacji polityki zagranicznej pañstwa. W artykule analizie poddano okres
rz¹dów JDP z uwzglêdnieniem takich zmian strukturalnych jak przeobra¿enie profilu handlu za-
granicznego Turcji, turystyki wyjazdowej i przyjazdowej, a tak¿e zmian w tureckim ‘przemyœle
kultury’. Analizie poddano równie¿ za³o¿enia polityki zagranicznej partii JDP, prezentowane
przez Ahmeta Davutoglu – by³ego ministra spraw zagranicznych, odpowiedzialnego za okreœle-
nie i prowadzenie zmian w polityce zagranicznej Turcji.
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